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ABSTRACT
Political Lawyers: The Structure of a National Network
Some research on lawyers active in politics has found that the ties among them create
networks in which a center or core of influential actors is surrounded by more peripheral
participants. Other studies, however, found more segmented networks, sometimes lacking central
players. This research examines the structure and determinants of political ties among 47 elite
lawyers who served organizations prominent in fourteen national policy issues in 2004-2005.
The analysis finds a network structure that resembles a rough circle with Republicans on one
side and Democrats on the other. Lawyers affiliated with organizations representing a broad
constellation of interests are closer to the center of the network, while those working for
specialized or narrow causes tend to be located in the periphery. Ties are more dense among
conservatives than among liberals. Lawyers who work as organizational leaders or managers are
more likely to be near the center than are litigators. Central actors contribute larger amounts to
election campaigns. The organized bar, especially the American Bar Association, appears to
provide links between liberals and conservatives in one segment of the network.
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Given the prominence of lawyers in politics, one might expect scholarly attention to the
networks of relationships among politically active lawyers. The structure of such networks and
the positions of particular types of lawyers within them reflect and influence the power,
resources, and missions of the organizations the lawyers serve (Southworth et al. 2010). Most
research on the political networks of lawyers, however, has focused on specific contexts such as
the Supreme Court bar (McGuire 1993) and lawyers working for conservative and libertarian
organizations (Heinz et al. 2003; Paik et al. 2007). Little of the scholarly work has studied
lawyers who represent diverse constituencies spanning the ideological spectrum (but see
Laumann et al. 1985).
In this paper, we investigate the structure and determinants of networks among a broad
set of lawyers involved in national policymaking. We examine the observed patterns of ties and
assess the extent to which they reflect social and political cleavages – that is, the tendency for
network ties to occur more frequently among lawyers sharing characteristics such as gender,
party affiliation, legal roles, geographic region, and law school prestige. We also examine
whether lawyers’ positions in this network are related to political contributions in federal
elections.
There is a considerable scholarly literature arguing that networks of relationships
among elites active in American politics are characterized by clear hierarchies in which
peripheral players surround a dense core of influential, well-connected actors. That work
includes Mills’s The Power Elite (1956), William Domhoff’s The Bohemian Grove (1974)
and Who Rules America Now (1983), Gwen Moore’s “The Structure of a National Elite
Network” (1979), and Michael Useem’s The Inner Circle (1984), among many other
accounts. A survey of Washington lawyers and lobbyists in the 1980s, however, concluded
1
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that the relationships among them were divided into clusters or segments associated with
distinct specialties defined by policy areas and clientele (Heinz et al., 1993). The core of the
network structure was empty – i.e., there were few, if any, central actors.1 It is not clear
whether the difference in findings was attributable to the research methods used, or time (i.e.,
historical effects), or differences among the populations studied. For example, the shared
professional training of lawyers and the institutions of the legal profession, including the
courts and the organized bar, may increase the likelihood of contact among members of that
occupational “community.” A recent study of lawyers serving conservative political
organizations found a stable core in the center of the network (Paik et al. 2007, Southworth
2008). However, because that finding could be attributable to the ideological affinity of the
set of actors examined, a comparable analysis of lawyers representing a larger range of
interest groups may be informative.
Several theoretical models of political networks have been posited. Knoke’s (1990)
typology, shown in Figure 1, presents four hypothesized structures: centrally administered,
polarized, bargaining, and polycentric (also see Laumann and Marsden 1979). The
centralized network consists of a subset of actors that dictate decisions, while the more
peripheral blocks exert little influence. The polarized network lacks central actors -- coalitions
are clustered in two opposing camps, due to a dominant cleavage. In the bargaining model,
core actors serve as mediators among and representatives for competing political
constituencies. In the polycentric network, multiple cleavages separate coalitions, so that key
actors are decentralized. Importantly, the mechanism giving rise to these distinct network

1

Networks lacking central actors have also been observed in studies of gift giving (Malinoski 1922), marriage ties
across subgroups (Bearman 1997), and sexual relationships (Bearman et al. 2004).
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structures is the degree of dissimilarity among the underlying constituencies of political actors
(Laumann and Marsden 1979). The centrally administered network, for example, lacks
cleavages among competing political interests, and in the polarized model there is only a
single division among the parties. The bargaining and polycentric models both reflect
multiple cleavages.
[Figure 1 about here]
Since a previous survey of Washington lawyers and lobbyists (Heinz et al. 1993),
found a network lacking central actors, we designed this research to provide a stringent test of
that finding. On the assumption that lawyers’ shared skills and knowledge would tend to draw
them together, creating a set of core actors, we chose to focus on lawyers involved in a set of
issues on which lawyers are especially active and in which their professional knowledge and
skills are highly relevant. Thus, the question is: Will we find some lawyers acting as
mediators or brokers, occupying the center of the network and serving to bridge left and right,
or does the network have a hollow core, lacking actors who provide links between contending
partisans?
Lawyers’ Characteristics, Roles, Political Ties, and Influence
Social and political factors influence network structures. Political cleavages,
reflecting ideological differences or varying political constituencies, create both ties and
structural holes. Ties spanning multiple political boundaries may be especially difficult to
create and maintain. Homophily – the tendency of individuals to associate with others who
are similar (“birds of a feather flock together”) – often influences connections. But while
gender, age, education, race and ethnicity are well-known determinants of contact, less is
known about the effects of lawyers’ professional roles. Some lawyers attempt to influence
3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694627

public policy in courts, of course, while others work in legislatures, government agencies, the
media, and grassroots campaigns (Laumann et al. 1985). These different types of political
work often reinforce one another, and lawyers may engage in several strategies
simultaneously and collaborate with other types of actors – e.g., lobbyists, media relations
personnel, and community organizers – to accomplish their goals.
Lawyers who engage in legislative work seek to forge compromises among varying
constituencies in order to create a winning coalition, while those who focus primarily on
litigation might be less likely to build bridges across issue areas or ideological divides
(although they sometimes build litigation alliances within their issue areas). Litigators may
more often interact with other litigators than with lawyers who engage primarily in lobbying,
media work, or grassroots strategies, and lawyer-lobbyists may be more likely to interact with
others who engage in legislative work.
The issue agendas of organizational clients influence the network roles of their
lawyers. Advocates for umbrella groups, for example, are more likely to serve as brokers than
are lawyers who serve single issue advocacy organizations, and representatives of broad
economic interests may be more likely to bridge constituencies than are advocates for groups
committed to symbolic crusades (Salisbury et al. 1987). Moreover, particular policy issues are
associated with particular strategies. For example, because obscenity and pornography are
subject to settled (if vague) legal precedents that do not invite high profile litigation, lawyers
involved in those issues generally fight their battles in legislatures and the press rather than in
the courts. Their patterns of interaction may reflect this. In contrast, we might expect
litigators – especially appellate advocates – to be prominent in the networks of political actors
involved in unsettled and highly contested constitutional issues, such as abortion, gun control,
4
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property rights, and the relationship between church and state. Thus, we hypothesize that
political ties will be more likely between lawyers who share work roles.
Finally, there are likely to be relationships between positions in the network and the
relative influence of the actors in those positions. Lawyers who serve large, well-funded,
stable organizations are more likely to hold pivotal positions in political networks than are
lawyers who serve small, poor, and ephemeral groups (Paik et al. 2007). “Centrality”
measures identify persons occupying core positions that are correlated with power, influence,
status, and control of information (Freeman 1979; Friedkin 1991; Bonacich 1987; Paik et al.
2007). Because these centrality measures assess relationally-defined power, prestige, or
influence, they are proxies for ability to lead. If some actors are particularly influential, as
brokers or as leaders, it may be instructive to examine their attributes. We analyze the
relationship between network centrality and the lawyers’ political contributions to federal
election campaigns. Lawyers’ political contributions may reflect their status, political
visibility, and/or level of commitment to the causes they serve.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The sample consists of forty-seven elite lawyers who worked for organizations
involved in national policy issues during 2004 and 2005. To select this sample, we employed
a “hypernetwork” approach (McPherson 1982), which involved first specifying a population
of organizations involved in national policymaking and then identifying lawyers who served
those organizations. We identified organizations that were active on matters classified as
“legal affairs” issues by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac in 2004 and 2005.2 The

2

In the study of political networks, it is crucial to define system boundaries (Laumann, Marsden & Prensky 1989).
We used newspaper accounts of a set of “issue events” to identify the active organizations (Knoke 1994).
5
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particular events (listed in Appendix Table A.1) concerned abortion, gay rights, asbestos
compensation, class action lawsuits, DNA testing/victims’ rights, flag desecration, identity
theft, medical malpractice liability, guns, bankruptcy, judicial nominations, federal court
jurisdiction, eminent domain, and the Terri Schiavo case. More than 2,000 interest groups
appeared in news stories about these events in twenty newspapers and magazines (see
Appendix Table A.2), but we focused on a subset of 119 organizations found in six or more
news accounts.3 Those organizations, listed in Appendix Table A.3, include businesses, trade
associations, membership organizations, religious groups, think tanks, and many of the bestknown liberal, conservative, and libertarian policy organizations.
We found that 1,149 lawyers served the 119 organizations in litigation or legislative
testimony on the fourteen issues, or as registered lobbyists, or as members of the
organizations’ boards of directors. To select the lawyers who were most likely to be key
players in public policy networks, we identified 98 lawyers who served more than one of the
119 organizations or who played multiple roles within an organization (e.g., as advocate and
officer, or as board member and lobbyist). We then searched for the names of those 98
lawyers in four on-line sources: the Lexis/Nexis “major newspapers” database, CQ
Congressional Testimony, Roll Call, and National Journal. Forty-seven of the 98 lawyers
were mentioned 100 or more times in those sources from 2000 through 2008. For each of
these 47 lawyers, we gathered biographical information, data on campaign contributions to
presidential races and the major parties from 2000 through 2008, and organizational ties
(including employment, board memberships, and volunteer activities) during the same period,
3

Some of the nonprofit organizations listed “related” organizations on their IRS Form 990s. We included data
about those organizations in our analysis.
6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694627

and we coded party affiliation based on the lawyers’ patterns of contributions. We then
constructed an affiliation matrix consisting of lawyers and their ties to organizations.4
FINDINGS
Sample Characteristics
The lawyers examined here are leaders of the organizations they serve and prominent
advocates in the arenas that shape public policy, including courts, Congress, administrative
and regulatory agencies, and the media. Collectively, they have held a variety of important
positions in politics and government. Two were presidential candidates, one was Attorney
General, two were governors, four were Congressmen, four were presidents of the American
Bar Association, one was a state supreme court justice, one was counsel to the president, one
was a cabinet secretary, five held White House staff positions, and two were U.S. attorneys.
Many of them founded influential organizations. Some are accomplished appellate advocates,
while others are among the most effective lobbyists in Washington. Brief biographies of the
47 lawyers are included in Appendix Table A4.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 47 lawyers. Perhaps reflecting the elite
character of this set of lawyers, 83% were men and 66% were based in Washington, DC.
Forty percent were known primarily as litigators or legislative advocates, while 60% played
broader roles in the organizations and causes they served, as organizational leaders. Roughly
half were Democrats (49%) and 43% were Republicans; the remaining lawyers were not
clearly identified with either major party. Nearly two-thirds of the lawyers were educated in
top law schools: 28% have law degrees from “elite” law schools, defined as the top 6 schools
We converted the affiliation matrix (A) into a 47x47 matrix, N, by multiplying A by its transpose (N=A*A). Cell
values in the N matrix indicate the number of shared ties to organizations for each pair of lawyers.
7
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in the 2000 U.S. News & World Report rankings, and 34% from schools ranked 7 through 20.
In general, the 47 lawyers are well-connected and active in political campaigns. Their mean
number of organizational ties and amount of political contributions were 7.3 and $13,012,
respectively. The latter figure reflects the exceptionally large contributions of C. Boyden
Gray during this period; he alone gave $428,000. The median contribution level was $1,300.
[Table 1 about here]
The Network Structure
Figure 2 presents an analysis of ties among the 47 lawyers in the sample.5 The ties
used here are joint affiliations with organizations. This is a “two-mode” analysis, meaning
that we show both the individual lawyers and the organizations that connect pairs of lawyers.6
The data concerning ties are drawn from records of litigation and lobbying on the set of “legal
affairs” issues, boards of directors lists, and lawyers’ biographies.7
[Figure 2 about here]
In the figure, liberals and the organizations that pursue their causes usually appear on
the left side of the space, while conservatives are on the right. At the upper right is the
conservative establishment: the Heritage Foundation, Federalist Society, American Enterprise
Institute, RAND Corporation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a former U.S. Attorney General
(Meese), two former Congressmen (Porter and McIntosh), and two former governors (Keating
and Engler). Just to the right of the middle are two very prominent Republicans -- Donald
5

One lawyer, Keane, does not appear in the figure because he does not share an organizational affiliation with any
of the other 46 lawyers.
6
The analysis uses a “spring-embedding” algorithm. The lawyers and organizations, represented by points, are
pulled together or apart by their varying ties to others. In the algorithm, these competing forces correspond to
tension exerted by springs, and the springs pull against a constant force, pushing the actors apart. The resulting
location of each point in the solution is a product of these several forces, operating simultaneously.
7
Not all organizations that are included here appear in the news stories about the issue-events. Although many of
them do appear there, this set of organizations is broader.
8
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Hodel, Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan administration and a former president of both
the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, and C. Boyden Gray, counsel to the
President in the first Bush administration and Ambassador to the European Union in the
second. The positions of these two lawyers suggest that they could serve as mediators between
differing elements of the Republican coalition, especially between business interests, in the
middle right, and social conservatives, on the lower right.
Connections, indicated by lines linking organizations to lawyers, are especially dense
just to the right of the center, where we find the Federalist Society, American Enterprise
Institute, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bretton Woods Committee, Council for National
Policy,8 the Bush and McCain presidential campaigns, Citizens for a Sound Economy, and the
Brookings Institution (see 2, 3, and 4). This indicates that organizations and lawyers
representing business interests, such Gray and Engler (President and CEO of the National
Association of Manufacturers), are especially well-integrated. A smaller area with dense
connections is below the center and a bit to the left (see 5 and 6). This area includes Thurgood
Marshall, Jr., and some former presidents of the American Bar Association (Grey, Greco, and
Curtin), as well as the ABA’s chief lobbyist, Robert D. Evans. Note the presence here of
Democratic election campaign organizations - - the Obama and Hillary Clinton presidential
campaigns and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. The ABA appears to
connect business interests to these liberal groups.

8

The Council for National Policy was founded in 1981 by Tim LaHaye, then head of the Moral Majority. It has
been described as “a little-known club of a few hundred of the most powerful conservatives in the country [who,
since 1981] have met behind closed doors at undisclosed locations for a confidential conference . . . to strategize
about how to turn the country to the right” (Kirkpatrick 2004).
9
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At the left of the space are organizations and lawyers devoted to particular liberal
causes - - Planned Parenthood, People for the American Way, NAACP, Consumers Union,
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights, Alliance for Justice, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun
Violence, and Third Way (formerly, Americans for Gun Safety). All but one of the eight
women in the sample and all of the four African-American lawyers appear on the left side.
The ties in this broad region are generally more sparse than they are on the right. This
suggests that the liberals are less well-integrated, less densely-connected than are
conservatives, especially business interests. We test this proposition more formally in the next
section of the paper.
Libertarians and their advocates – Bob Barr (2008 Libertarian presidential candidate),
Robert Levy (Cato Institute senior fellow), and Dana Berliner (Institute for Justice senior
attorney) -- appear at the top center. In structural as well as ideological terms, these lawyers
stand between liberals and conservatives.
There is an open area in the center of the space. The Hogan and Hartson law firm (H &
H) is within this hole in the doughnut because Barnes (a Democrat) and Porter (a Republican)
were both partners in that firm. (They are also both former Congressmen.) If we focus only on
the lawyers, we see that those closest to the center are Porter, Hodel, Gray, Archer, Henderson
(President of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights), and Levy, arranged in a rough
circle. Of these six, three held high office in the federal government and a fourth, Archer, was
mayor of Detroit and president of the ABA. Meese, Barr, and Conrad are also near the center,
and two of those three are also former federal officials. The organizations that provide the
most links - - the ABA and the Federalist Society - - are located on the rim of this inner circle.
Both are lawyers’ professional associations. The ABA, the older and larger of the two,
10
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lobbies on a diverse range of public policy issues. The Federalist Society, a newer
organization that presents itself as a conservative/libertarian “counter-ABA” (Teles 2008,
167), does not itself take formal policy positions. However, its fifteen nationwide practice
groups facilitate members’ involvement in public policy controversies ranging from securities
and antitrust to religious liberties (Southworth 2008).
The litigators in this figure are active on policy issues in which constitutional case law
is unsettled: abortion (Brown, Weber, Roger Evans), gun regulation (Henigan), property rights
(Berliner), and church-state issues (Bull, Baylor, Mincberg). These lawyers are scattered on
the periphery of the structure, indicating that they are not well-integrated in the network.
Figure 3 shows the lawyers’ party affiliations. All of the Republicans are on the right
side of the space, and all but one of the Democrats are on the left side. The exception, Jeffrey
Peck, appears on the right due to his lobbying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Peck’s web page explains the seeming anomaly; it cites press coverage identifying him as one of
the “leading Democratic lobbyists” and as the consultant “Wall Street turns to . . . for
representation in the Democratic-controlled Congress.”
[Figure 3 about here]
Determinants of network ties and political contributions
Table 2 presents structural blockmodels examining whether characteristics of the lawyers
are associated with shared organizational ties. The models partition the matrix of co-affiliations
based on lawyers’ attributes (e.g., gender, party affiliation, etc.). The observed densities of ties
within and across these categories are then compared to a distribution of densities generated by
randomly permuting the rows and the columns of the matrix of lawyers. Thus, this
blockmodeling approach tests whether the observed densities of ties in the blocks are
11
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significantly different from a distribution based on random interaction (Wasserman and Faust
1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
In Model 1, we tested the hypothesis that shared ties within gender were more common
than would be the case if the ties were randomly distributed. This model shows no significant
parameters. Models 4 and 5 are also nonsignificant, suggesting that lawyers who share
geographic region or law school background are not more likely to be tied than one would expect
if interactions were random. Model 2, however, shows that shared party affiliation is associated
with an increased probability of ties. Party affiliation explains 8% of the variance in pairwise
ties. Specifically, the probability of ties across parties is .09, and this estimate is nonsignificant,
indicating that cross-party ties are no different from random interactions. In contrast, both
Republicans and Democrats are likely to be tied to lawyers who share their party affiliation. The
probability of shared ties among Republicans is 27 percentage points greater than the probability
of ties across party.9 For Democrats, the increased probability is 11 percentage points greater
than cross-party ties. Finally, Model 4 shows the presence of homophily based on lawyers’
roles. Overall, shared roles explain 3% of the variance in pairwise ties, but the only significant
coefficient is for lawyers who are not primarily litigators or lobbyists. Lawyers who play
broader roles are 14 percentage points more likely to be tied to one another than to lawyers in the
other categories.
[Table 2 about here]
Taken together, the results of the structural blockmodels suggest that party affiliation and
lawyers’ roles are important determinants of the network structure. We also found that

9

While the significance test is based on the extent of difference from a random distribution, the comparison here is
among observed patterns of the groups or categories.
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homophily biases are greater for Republicans than Democrats. This is evident in Figure 2, which
shows substantially more clustering on the right side of the figure than on the left. The salience
of ideological differences highlights the fact that the observed structure is an oppositional
network.
Table 3 presents regressions of shared ties to other lawyers, or degree centrality, and of
campaign contributions (logged), using the same variables. Because of our small sample size,
we estimated stepwise regressions where only significant covariates were retained.10 The first
model is a regression of the number of shared ties to other lawyers on party affiliation and
lawyers’ roles. This regression shows that lawyers who are Democrats have three fewer
connections than Republicans (p<.05), controlling for the lawyers’ roles, which is consistent with
our previous findings. In addition, lawyers who play broader organizational roles tend to have
almost six more connections than litigators. Lobbyists have approximately four more
connections than litigators, but this finding was not statistically significant (p<.10).
[Table 3 about here]
In the model of political contributions, once we introduce degree centrality into the model
none of the other covariates are significant. However, dummy variables for other party, lawyers’
roles, and attending regional law schools were significant in bivariate regressions (results
available upon request). This suggests that those three variables are associated with the level of
political contributions, directly or indirectly, but that those associations are overwhelmed by the
effect of network centrality, which is substantial. Each additional network tie is associated with

10

Network data are not independently drawn, so standard inferential statistics will not produce correct standard
errors. Instead, we employ a bootstrapping regression approach that compares obtained parameter estimates against
a distribution of parameter estimates generated through random permutations. The models presented in Table 3 are
the final models for centrality and political donations.
13
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a 30% increase in political contributions. It is possible that players who occupy central positions
in the network may feel greater obligations or pressure to contribute to election campaigns, or
their level of commitment to the causes they advocate may be greater. Alternatively, the
relationship between centrality and the level of contributions may be attributable to a third
variable such as status, prominence, or visibility.
DISCUSSION
Essentially, the network structure is a variant of Knoke’s “polarized” model, where a
substantial cleavage divides political actors into two factions. Certainly, we find an oppositional
network in which conflicting interest groups are located in separate areas of the space. It is
sharply divided by party. The structure, however, is not simply two opposing camps with open
territory between their lines. Rather, we see a network that resembles a rough circle, with a hole
at its center. This occurs because political blocs have edges or boundaries where there is a
greater proximity to other interest groups - - proximity both in terms of ideological position or
programmatic goals and in terms of the likelihood of interaction. Interest group coalitions have
centers and peripheries, and actors closer to the center or core of a coalition are likely to be purer
in their views, stronger in their ideological commitments, and more supportive of the coalition’s
goals than are those at the margins (see, generally, Hogg 1987; Miller and Komorita 1986;
Levine and Moreland 1990).
Thus, if we think of a stylized network structure with competing interest coalitions
formed into two lines, opposing phalanxes, the actors at the ends of each of those lines are less
fully integrated into the respective coalitions and thus more susceptible to proposals offered
across the lines. This will tend to bend the lines toward each other, perhaps in some cases

14
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forming a circle. In our case, left and right are brought together by mediating institutions such as
the ABA and the ACLU.
In Figure 2, if we begin at the lower right and then move around the circle in a counterclockwise direction, we find that social and religious conservatives affiliated with the American
Center for Law and Justice and the Alliance Defense Fund are connected to business interests
through organizations like the Bush and McCain presidential campaigns and through lawyers
like Sekulow.11 The ties of Hodel and Gray bridge business and religious conservative
constituencies. Recall that Hodel held cabinet posts in the Reagan Administration and serves on
various corporate boards, while also maintaining ties to Christian conservative groups. Gray, the
epitome of the Washington insider and the Republican establishment, also organized the
Committee for Justice, a business group that worked with social conservatives to secure
confirmation of President Bush’s judicial nominees, including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito. The Federalist Society, Heritage Foundation, and American Enterprise Institute, and
lawyers such as Meese and Barr, tie business conservatives to libertarians such as Levy, of the
Cato Institute, and Berliner, of the Institute for Justice. Libertarians are, in turn, a bridge (albeit
a rather narrow one) to the left side of the space through the ACLU, with whom they share a
commitment to First Amendment issues, including freedom of speech and freedom of
association. The ACLU provides ties, direct and indirect, to organizations concerned with church
and state issues, such as People for the American Way, and with civil rights, such as the NAACP
and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. A branch of the network at the far left of the

11

As chief counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice, Sekulow has handled most of the religious right’s
most important Supreme Court cases, but he also served with Gray and Meese on a team of lawyers advising
President George W. Bush on judicial strategy. This team of lawyers, which also included Leonard Leo, executive
vice president of the Federalist Society, dubbed themselves “the four horsemen” (Edsall & Milbank 2005).
15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694627

space includes lawyers and organizations advocating consumer rights. The civil rights groups
are also tied to gun control groups and the Kerry and Obama presidential campaigns. Continuing
counterclockwise, and reaching the bottom of the space, there are ties to the Gore and Hillary
Clinton campaigns and to former presidents of the ABA. The ABA and its lawyers, in turn, are
linked to businesses, which brings us back to the point at which we began this paragraph. Victor
Schwartz represents one bridge between conservatives and the leadership of the ABA. He is a
founder of the American Tort Reform Association and advocates restrictions on tort liability, but
he also has served as chair of the ABA’s Legislative Subcommittee of the Product Liability
Committee.12 Similarly, Robin Conrad, executive vice-president of the National Chamber
Litigation Center, has directed litigation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on federal
preemption, punitive damages, and class actions, and she also has been active in the ABA.
Instead of displaying a simple, unidimensional cleavage, the structure is a multifaceted
network in which distinct interest group constituencies overlap with others in agenda or
ideology, so that one coalition shades into another through institutional ties. Work roles and
geographic locations shape these ties, making some sorts of connection more likely than others.
As we saw in Figure 2 and Table 3, lawyers who are primarily litigators are less well-integrated
than lawyers who play broader roles.
The only tie that bridges the open center of the space is that between Barnes on the left
and Porter on the right, through their shared affiliation with the Hogan and Hartson law firm.
This tie, and those through the Georgetown Law School and the U.S. Supreme Court Historical

12

In our analysis of the lawyers’ individual campaign contributions, we found that Schwartz has primarily
supported Republicans but has also given money to Democrats.
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Society, may not advance shared political goals, but they provide an institutional framework or
setting in which contacts are made and operational connections can be formed.
The other striking characteristic of this network is that ties among conservatives,
especially business conservatives, are notably more dense than those among liberals. It appears
that liberals have not created umbrella groups that effectively integrate lawyers associated with
varying liberal causes in a manner analogous to the function performed for the right by the
Federalist Society, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute. Conservative
patrons and organizational entrepreneurs have sought to create opportunities for interaction
among lawyers with diverse ideological commitments (Southworth 2008). This strategy was
based on the belief that common professional perspectives and joint occupational interests would
enable lawyers to promote comity among the sometimes conflicting constituencies of the
Republican coalition and encourage them to cooperate in public policymaking. Liberal
coalitions such as the Alliance for Justice and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights claim
to speak for diverse groups on the political left,13 and they may well help liberal groups forge
common positions. But their integrative role is not discernable in the organizational affiliations
of this sample of individual lawyers. The American Constitution Society is an effort to create a
liberal equivalent of the Federalist Society, 14 but the ACS does not appear in our data.
Established professional institutions, such as the Federalist Society and American Bar
Association, which appear to play important roles in organizing this network, command their

13

The Leadership Conference’s members include many of the 119 organizations from which our sample of lawyers
was drawn, such as the ACLU, NAACP, AARP, National Consumer Law Center, Lambda, NOW, National
Women’s Law Center, Planned Parenthood, Feminist Majority, NOW, AFL-CIO, and People for the American
Way. Many members of the Alliance for Justice were also on our list of organizations – e.g., Lambda, NOW,
National Abortion Federation, National Women’s Law Center, Planned Parenthood, and the Sierra Club.
14
For analyses of the Federalist Society’s role in integrating the conservative coalition, see Paik et al. (2007),
Southworth (2008).
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own loyalties. These organizations provide opportunities for lawyers to further their careers by
increasing their visibility and acquiring contacts with other lawyers who may be in a position to
refer clients or provide other professional advantages. Such organizations, as a consequence,
draw lawyers together around purposes distinct from the objectives of the clients they serve.
Some lawyers become institutional politicians, seeking to advance their status within the
organizational hierarchy.
Our research design, of course, identifies only some of the relevant links among these
lawyers. We did not interview them, and we know little about their acquaintances. They may
make useful connections with other lawyers at churches and synagogues, fitness classes and
book groups, the opera or their children’s soccer games. Such ties might serve as a basis for
cooperation in public policymaking through informal means that are not seen in the forms of
joint participation examined here. It is also possible that these lawyers participate in joint
litigation and legislative activities on matters not included in the “legal affairs” issues that are the
focus of this study. Nonetheless, this research suggests that liberals do not enjoy the dense web
of organizational ties that previous research documented among prominent lawyers of the right
(Paik et al. 2007; Heinz et al.2003). If lawyer networks provide channels for cooperation and
serve to lessen conflict and facilitate constructive bargaining among disparate constituencies, the
political right may hold a distinct advantage over its rivals.
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Appendix A
Table A1: The Issue Events
Fetal Protection (2004): Congress passed a bill (HR 1997—PL 108-21), which President Bush
signed, giving federal legal status to a fetus. The legislation made it a separate offense to harm a
fetus during the commission of a federal crime against a pregnant woman.
Gay Rights (2004): A proposed constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage failed in the
House and Senate (S J Res 40, H J Res 106). Republicans hoped to prevent judges from
invalidating the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as “a legal union
between one man and one woman.”
Asbestos Compensation (2004): Republican Senators failed to pass legislation (S 2290) to
create a no-fault compensation fund for victims of asbestos exposure.
Class Action Lawsuits (2004): Failed Republican legislation (S 2062) would have limited
plaintiffs’ opportunities to file class action lawsuits in state courts.
DNA Testing/Victims Rights (2004): Legislation was signed into law (HR 5107—PL 108-405)
making it easier for inmates to gain access to post-conviction DNA tests while also allowing
retrials for cases in which test results indicated an inmate might not be guilty.
Flag Desecration (2004): A proposed constitutional amendment to criminalize physical
desecration of the American flag failed to move beyond the Senate Judiciary Committee (S J Res
4).
Identity Theft (2004): On July 15, President Bush signed into law a bill cleared by Congress
(HR 1731—PL 108-275) establishing stronger criminal penalties for identity theft.
Medical Malpractice (2004): Republicans attempted but failed to cap non-economic damage
awards in medical malpractice suits (S 2061).
Guns (2004): Due to a number of Democratic amendments, such as one renewing the 1994 ban
on semi-automatic assault weapons, Republican Senators failed to pass legislation (S 1805)
aimed at limiting the firearm industry’s liability for gun violence. The bill would have barred
civil lawsuits against manufacturers, distributors, and importers of firearms and ammunition.
Bankruptcy Overhaul (2004): Despite extensive bipartisan support for legislation aimed at
making it more difficult for individuals to erase their debts by filing for bankruptcy protection,
Congress was unable clear the bill (HR 975, S1920). Nonetheless, Congress did pass legislation
allowing family farmers to restructure their debts without losing their land (S 2864—PL 108369).
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Judicial Nominations (2004): Although Democratic Senators blocked 10 of Bush’s appellate
court nominees through procedural votes, Bush nonetheless filled 203 lifetime seats on federal
district and appellate courts. Moreover, Republicans pushed for a Senate rules change—the
“nuclear option”—requiring only a 51-vote majority to break filibusters of judicial nominees.
Federal Court jurisdiction (2004): In an attempt to limit federal judges’ jurisdiction over
certain types of cases while also redrawing appellate court maps, the House passed three bills:
HR 3313 barred federal courts from hearing cases challenging a provision of the Defense of
Marriage Act; HR 2028 denied federal courts jurisdiction over challenges to the wording of the
Pledge of Allegiance; and, S 878 added provisions to divide the 9th Circuit into three separate
appeals courts.
Judicial Nominations (2005): After Justice Rehnquist’s death, Bush nominated John Roberts to
succeed Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as Chief Justice, and the Senate confirmed. The Senate
also confirmed the nomination of Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court and five of seven
previously filibustered lower federal court nominees.
Asbestos Compensation (2005): On May 26, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill (S
852—S Rept 109—97) creating a $140 billion trust fund to compensate people sickened by
asbestos exposure.
Medical Malpractice (2005): In an effort to cap non-economic damage awards in medical
malpractice cases at $250,000 and to limit punitive damages to two times the economic damages
or $250,000, Republicans passed a bill in the House (HR 5), but failed in the Senate.
Class Action Lawsuits (2005): On Feb.18, President Bush signed a measure giving federal
courts jurisdiction over class action lawsuits when the total amount in dispute exceeded $5
million and the defendant and a large portion of the plaintiffs lived in different states (S 5—PL
109-2).
Eminent Domain (2005): The House Judiciary Committee decisively approved a measure (HR
4128—H Rept 109—262) limiting the effects of a controversial Supreme Court ruling (Kelo v.
New London) on eminent domain. The bill sought to prohibit states and localities receiving
federal development funds from using eminent domain to seize private property for economic
development.
Guns (2005): Legislation limiting the legal liability of firearms makes and dealers was cleared
and signed into law. Democrats attached several amendments, including a requirement that child
safety locks be sold with all handguns.
Flag Desecration (2005): The House passed a proposed constitutional amendment (HJ Res
10—H Rpt 109-131) to criminalize physical desecration of the American flag, but the Senate did
not clear the bill.
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Abortion (2005): The House passed a bill (HR 748) to expand the reach of state laws requiring
parental consent or notification when a minor seeks an abortion. The measure required doctors
to notify parents in person or by mail of an out-of-state minor’s request for an abortion, and it
gave guardians the right to sue noncompliant doctors.
Terri Schiavo Case (2005): The House and Senate passed a bill to allow the parents of Terri
Schiavo to go to federal court and have their daughter’s feeding tube restored. However, federal
courts rebuffed Schiavo’s parents’ attempt to intervene.
Table A2: List of Media for Issue Event Searches
Wall Street Journal
New York Times
Washington Post
Los Angeles Times
Chicago Tribune
Dallas Morning News
Atlanta Journal & Constitution
Time
Newsweek
U.S. News & World Report
National Journal
Washington Monthly
Roll Call
Washington Times
National Review
The Nation
Weekly Standard
American Spectator
The New Republic
The American Prospect

Table A3: Organizations
AFL-CIO
Allan Guttmacher Institute
Alliance Defense Fund
Alliance for Justice
Alliance for Marriage
American Association of Retired Persons
American Bankers Association
American Bankruptcy Institute
American Bar Association
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American Center for Law and Justice
American Civil Liberties Union
American Conservative Union
American Enterprise Institute
American Family Association
American Insurance Association
American Legion
American Medical Association
American Tort Reform Association
American Values
Third Way
Americans for Tax Reform
Americans United for Separation of Church and State
America's Health Insurance Plans
American Association for Justice
Arlington Group
Bank of America
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence
Brookings Institution
Cato Institute
Center for a Just Society
Center for Responsive Politics
ChoicePoint, Inc.
Christian Coalition of America
Christian Defense Coalition
Citigroup
Citizens Flag Alliance
Club for Growth
Coalition for Asbestos Reform
Committee for Justice
Concerned Women for America
Consumer Federation of America
Democratic Leadership Council
Democratic National Committee
Dupont Co.
Eagle Forum
Earthjustice
Environmental Working Group
Equitas Ltd.
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist
Convention
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Exxon Mobil Corp
Family Foundation
Family Research Council, Inc.
Federal Mogul Co.
Federalist Society
Feminist Majority Foundation
Feminists for Life
Fidelis
Focus on the Family
Ford Motor Co.
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
Free Congress Foundation
Freedom Works
General Electric
Georgia Equality
Georgia Hospital Association PAC
Georgia-Pacific Corp
Georgia Right to Life
Georgia Watch
Gun Owners of America
Halliburton Co.
Heritage Foundation
Human Rights Campaign
Identity Theft Resource Center
Innocence Project
Institute for Justice
Judicial Confirmation Network
Kaiser Family Foundation
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
Log Cabin Republicans
MAG Mutual Insurance Co.
Manhattan Institute
Massachusetts Family Institute
Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland
Medical Society of the District of Columbia
Move On
NAACP
NARAL Pro Choice America
National Abortion Federation
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National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys
National Association of Evangelicals
National Association of Manufacturers
National Consumer Law Center
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
National Organization for Women
National Retail Federation
National Rifle Association
National Right to Life Committee
National Shooting Sports Foundation
National Women's Law Center
Operation Rescue
People for the American Way
Pew Research Center
Physician Insurers Association of America
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
Progress for America
Public Citizen
Rand Corp.
Sierra Club
Texas Medical Society
Traditional Values Coalition
Trial Lawyers Association of Metropolitan Wash DC
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
U.S. Public Interest Research Group
USG Corp.
Veterans of Foreign Wars
W.R. Grace and Company
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Table A4: Biographical Sketches
Anderson, Stanton. Senior counsel, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Heads legislative coalitions
to address “Global Regulatory Divergence” and to protect the lawyer-client privilege. Chaired
the Class Action Business Coalition, which won passage of the Class Action Reform Act of
2005. Counsel to the Reagan/Bush campaign in 1980, and served in White House and State
Department in the Nixon administration. Board member, Global U.S.A., a government relations
firm.
Archer, Dennis. Chair, Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman; partner since 1991.
President of the ABA, 2002-2003. Mayor of Detroit, 1994-2001. Justice, Michigan Supreme
Court, 1986-90. Former president, National Bar Association. Life member, NAACP.
Aron, Nan. President and founder, Alliance for Justice. Created AFJ’s Judicial Selection
Project, which helped to defeat Robert Bork’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987 and
to organize Senate filibuster of some of President George W. Bush’s judicial nominees. Runs
advocacy training programs to promote student social justice activism. Author of Liberty and
Justice for All: Public Interest Law in the 1980s and Beyond. Formerly worked for the National
Prison Project of ACLU and for the EEOC.
Barnes, Michael. Partner, Covington & Burling 2007. Previously partner in Hogan & Hartson.
President of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, 2000-2006. Maryland Congressman,
1979-1987. Has chaired numerous committees dealing with international issues and has
represented the governments of Chile, Cyprus, Panama, and South Korea. Served as Chair of
Center for National Policy and Co-Chair of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations
Development Program. Member, Council on Foreign Relations.
Barr, Bob. President, Liberty Strategies, a consulting firm in Atlanta. Libertarian Party
presidential candidate, 2008. Columnist, American Conservative Union, 2003-2008.
Congressman from Georgia, 1995-2003. U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia,
1986-90. President of Southeastern Legal Foundation, 1990-91. Contributing editor, American
Spectator. Board member, NRA, and IForce, a domestic and international security company.
Bauer, Gary. Founder and president, American Values, 2000-present. Founder and chairman of
Campaign for Working Families, 1996-present. President of the Family Research Council from
1988 to 1999, but resigned to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 2000. Served as
Deputy Assistant Director of Legal Policy (1981-82), Deputy Undersecretary of Education
(1982-85), and Undersecretary, U.S. Dept of Education (1985-1987) in the Reagan
administration. Has been active on judicial nominations, the proposed federal marriage
protection act, and Israeli security.
Baylor, Gregory. Senior counsel, Alliance Defense Fund. Litigates on behalf of Christian
causes, especially to protect the rights of Christians at public colleges and universities. Formerly
director of the Christian Legal Society Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Springfield, VA.
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Bennett, Matt. Vice-President for government affairs (and co-founder) of Third Way.
Communications Director for Clark for President campaign, 2004. Director of public affairs for
Americans for Gun Safety, 2001-04. Deputy assistant to the President in the Clinton
administration, responsible for liaison to governors.
Berliner, Dana. Senior attorney, Institute for Justice. Specializes in eminent domain and
administrative law issues. Best known for role in representing the homeowners in Kelo v. New
London.
Brown, Jennifer. Pro bono counsel at Morrison & Foerster, New York. Formerly legal director
of Legal Momentum (now called the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), after serving in
the Civil Rights Bureau of the NY Attorney General.
Bull, Benjamin. Executive Vice-President and chief counsel of the Alliance Defense Fund.
Formerly executive director of the European Center for Law and Justice, Strasbourg. Founding
general counsel of the American Family Association Law Center, and general counsel of the
Children’s Legal Foundation. Lead attorney in more than 300 cases, many dealing with
constitutional issues.
Cavendish, Elizabeth. Executive Director, Appleseed. Interim president (2004) and legal
director (1998-2003), NARAL. Formerly, office of legal counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice; assistant
prof., U. of Illinois law school.
Chambers, Julius. Of counsel in Ferguson Stein Chambers, etc., Charlotte, NC. Formerly
Director/Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and then chancellor of North Carolina
Central University. Director of Center for Civil Rights at UNC law school.
Cicconi, James. Senior Executive V-P for external and legislative affairs, AT&T. Partner, Akin
Gump, 1991-98. Assistant to President Reagan, 1989-90, and deputy chief of staff to President
George H.W. Bush. Director, El Paso Electric Co. Advisor to the Bush/Cheney transition.
Trustee, Brookings Institution.
Claybrook, Joan. President of Public Citizen, 1982-2008; lobbied for highway and auto safety
laws. Chaired the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1977-81. Formerly worked
for PIRG, National Traffic Safety Bureau, SSA, and the U.S. Dep’t of HEW. Board member,
Consumers Union.
Conrad, Robin. Executive Vice President of the National Chamber Litigation Center of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. Has directed Chamber’s litigation on federal preemption, punitive
damages, and class actions. Attorney/advisor to the EPA in the Reagan Administration. Member
of ABA Committee on the Status and Future of Federal e-Rulemaking.
Curtin, John. Of counsel, Bingham McCutchen, Boston; partner there 1964-2005. ABA
president, 1990-91. President, Boston Bar Association, 1979-81. Chaired Joint Bar Committee
on Judicial Appointments. Formerly Vice President and a Director of Greater Boston Legal
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Services and Chair of Ad Hoc Committee for Access to Justice. Board of directors, Nat’l
Consumer Law Center. Board, Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, 1990-95. Nat’l Ass’n Public
Interest Law. President, Fellowships for Equal Justice, 1992-95.
Engler, John. President and CEO, National Association of Manufacturers, 2004-present.
President of state and local governmental sector of Electronic Data Systems. Governor of
Michigan, 1991-2003. Michigan State Representative, 1970-79; Michigan State Senator, 19791990. On boards of Delta Airlines, Universal Forest Products, and Committee for Justice.
Evans, Robert. Director, Washington office of the ABA. Recipient of Nat’l Legal Aid and
Defender Ass’n Special Achievement Award, 1990. President, Project Northstar, 2004-06.
Member, American Law Institute.
Evans, Roger. Senior director of public policy litigation and law, Planned Parenthood. Counsel
in major reproductive rights cases since 1983. Formerly was managing attorney of MFY Legal
Services in New York City.
George, Robert. Professor of jurisprudence, Princeton University. Director, James Madison
Program in American Ideals and Institutions. Member, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 199398, and President’s Council on Bioethics, 2002-2005. Recipient of the Paul Bator Award from
the Federalist Society and the Silver Gavel Award from the ABA. On numerous boards,
including Institute on Religion and Democracy, Faith and Reason Institute, Family Research
Council, and Council on Foreign Relations.
Gould, James. Partner, Capitol Counsel. Specializes in tax and international trade. Formerly
worked as counsel to Senate Finance Committee under Chairman Lloyd Bentsen. Represents
energy, insurance, and financial services companies. Formerly a partner in Vinson & Elkins and
then Capitol Tax Partners, a tax policy lobbying firm.
Gray, C. Boyden. Special envoy to the European Union, 2008-09. U.S. Representative to
European Union, 2006-07. Partner, Wilmer Cutler, Washington, 1976-81 and 1993-2005.
Chairman, Citizens for a Sound Economy, 1993-2000. Counsel to the President, 1989-93.
Director of the Bush-Cheney Transition Department of Justice Advisory Committee. Chairman
of administrative law section of ABA, 2000-02. U.S. Marine Corps, 1964-70. On numerous
boards, including FreedomWorks, Federalist Society (board of visitors), Committee for Justice,
Atlantic Council, and Harvard University’s Committee on University Development.
Greco, Michael. Partner, K&L Gates, Boston. President of the ABA, 2005-06. Former
president, Massachusetts Bar Association, New England Bar Association, and New England Bar
Foundation. Active on legal services for the poor, civic education, separation of powers, and
nuclear arms control. Member of Commission on Federal Judicial Appointments, and vice-chair
of the Board of Overseers of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Member, American Law
Institute.
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Greenberg, Sally. Executive director, National Consumers League and co-chair, Child Labor
Coalition. Senior product safety counsel at Consumers Union, Washington, 1997-2007; lobbied
on auto safety, food and drug safety, product liability. Worked on Toby Moffett’s Congressional
staff 1977-81, and for the Anti-Defamation League, 1985-1996. Board member, Alliance for
Justice, HALT.
Greenberger, Marcia. Founder and co-President, National Women’s Law Center. Active in
legislative and litigation campaigns to expand women’s rights, particularly in connection with
education, employment, health, reproductive rights, and family economic security. Member of
the Executive Committee of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the American Bar
Association’s Commission on Diversity. American Law Institute member.
Grey, Robert. Partner in Hunton & Williams. President of the ABA in 2004-05. Practice
specializes in governmental relations and administrative law in state and federal agencies.
Washington and Lee University Board of Trustees.
Henderson, Wade. President and CEO of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Longtime lobbyist on civil rights issues. Formerly worked for ACLU and NAACP. Has lobbied for
affirmative action, welfare, gun control, immigrant rights, etc.
Henigan, Dennis. Director of the Legal Action Project of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence and legal director of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. Litigates cases
against firearms dealers and manufacturers and lobbies for stronger gun control law. Formerly,
partner at Foley & Lardner.
Hodel, Donald Paul. Chairman of FreeEats.com/cc Advertising, which has conducted “push
polls” for the Economic Freedom Fund. President of Focus on the Family, 2003-05. President of
Christian Coalition, 1997-99. Secretary of the Interior, 1985-89, and Secretary of Energy, 198285. Member of the board, Focus on the Family, and board of visitors, the Federalist Society.
Jenkins, Timothy. Partner in Nossaman LLP. Specializes in federal elections and ethics law.
Lobbies for financial services and pharmaceutical companies and industry associations. Active in
organizing and administering/managing PACs. Former staff member, Senate committees on
Government Affairs and Labor and Human Resources.
Keane, Lawrence. Senior vice president and general counsel, National Shooting Sports
Foundation. Lobbies on behalf of the firearms industry.
Keating, Francis. President, American Council of Life Insurers, 2003-present. Governor of
Oklahoma, 1995-2003. In the Reagan administration, he was an assistant secretary of the
Treasury (1985-88), and then an associate attorney general (1988-89). In the Bush I
administration, he was general counsel and acting deputy secretary of HUD. U.S. attorney for
the Northern District of Oklahoma, 1981-84. Former chairman of the Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission and the Republican Governors Association.
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Levy, Robert. Senior fellow, Cato Institute. Founder and former CEO, CDA Investment
Technologies. Board member, Institute for Justice, George Mason Law School, and member of
the board of advisors, Federalist Society. Organizer and financier of litigation challenging
D.C.’s gun-control statute, which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated in District of Columbia v.
Heller. Co-author of The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded
Government and Eroded Freedom.
Lynn, Barry. Executive Director, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1992present. Legislative counsel of ACLU, 1984-1991; president of Draft Action, Inc., 1981-83.
Ordained minister, United Church of Christ, since 1974. Author of Piety & Politics: The RightWing Assault on Religious Freedom.
McIntosh, David. Partner in Mayer Brown, Washington. Represents telecommunications,
energy, and healthcare companies. Former Congressman from Indiana, 1995-2001. Founder and
board chairman, Federalist Society. Special assistant to the President for domestic affairs in the
Reagan administration, and director of the President’s Council on Competitiveness in the Bush I
administration.
Marshall, Thurgood Jr. Partner in Bingham McCutcheon. Assistant to the President and
cabinet secretary in the Clinton White House, 1997-2001, and director of legislative affairs for
Vice President Gore. Previously counsel to three Senate committees, including Judiciary. Board
member, Ford Foundation, U.S. Postal Service, and Corrections Corporation of America.
Meese, Edwin. Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and Chair of the Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies, Heritage Foundation. Distinguished Visiting Fellow, the Hoover Institution.
U.S. Attorney General in the Reagan Administration, 1985-88 Serves on many boards, including
the Council on National Policy, Claremont Institute, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation,
American Civil Rights Union, Capital Research Center, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and
Federalist Society (board of visitors).
Mincberg, Elliot. Chief Counsel for Oversight and Investigations, House Judiciary Committee,
since 2007. Previously vice president, general counsel, and legal director of People for the
American Way, . Litigated religious liberty and First Amendment cases, including school prayer
and vouchers. Formerly a partner in Hogan and Hartson.
Peck, Jeffrey. Partner, Peck, Madigan, Jones & Stewart, 2001-present. Former managing
director of government and regulatory affairs of Andersen Worldwide, 1993-2000. Has lobbied
on Supreme Court nominations, flag burning, class action procedures, and financial services
issues. Formerly majority staff director of the Senate Judiciary Committee (then chaired by Sen.
Biden). Described by National Journal as one of the “leading Democratic lobbyists” and by The
Hill as the consultant “Wall Street turns to . .. for representation in the Democratic-controlled
Congress.”
Porter, John Edward. Partner, Hogan & Hartson. Former Congressman from Illinois, 19802001. Lobbyist on health issues. Board of directors, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, RAND
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Corporation, American Heart Association, Population Resource Center, Trustee, Brookings
Institution.
Reed, Stephen. Partner in Reed & Brown, Pasadena. Specializes in commercial real estate,
general business and corporate law, and non-profit organization. Board member, Focus on the
Family and Family Research Council.
Rich, Michael. Executive vice president, RAND Corporation, since 1993. Formerly head of the
RAND National Security Research Division and director of the National Defense Research
Institute. Chair, Int’l Institute for Strategic Studies - U.S. Board member, Council for Aid to
Education, Council on Foreign Relations, WISE & Health Aging.
Saperstein, David. Director and Counsel, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism. Has led
several national religious coalitions on social justice issues. Elected first Chair of U.S.
Commission on Int’l Religious Freedom, 1999, and appointed by President Obama to White
House Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. Board member, NAACP, People
for the AmericanWay. Adjunct professor, Georgetown Law School. Author of Jewish
Dimensions of Social Justice: Tough Moral Choices of Our Time.
Schwartz, Victor. Partner, Shook Hardy & Bacon, Washington. Practice specializes in insurance
defense. General counsel, American Tort Reform Association. Chair, Civil Justice Reform
Committee of the American Legislative Exchange Council. Chairman, Dep’t of Commerce Task
Force on Product Liability and Accident Compensation, 1977-80. Co-author of casebook:
Prosser, Wade & Schwartz’s, Cases and Materials on Torts (10th ed. 2000). On board of visitors
of the University of Cincinnati law school.
Sekulow, Jay. Chief Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice and the European Center for
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable

Mean or Prop

Gender
Male
Female
Party affiliation
Republican
Democrat
Other
Lawyer role
Litigation
Legislative advocate
Other role
Region
D.C.
South
Northeast
West/Midwest
Law school prestige
Elite
Prestige
Regional
Local

SD

0.83
0.17
0.43
0.49
0.09
0.19
0.21
0.60
0.66
0.11
0.13
0.11
0.28
0.34
0.15
0.23

Degree centrality
Political contributions
Political contributions (logged)

7.28
5.19
13,012.43 62,291.21
6.22
3.52
47

N
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Figure 2: Network Affiliations Between Lawyers and Organizations

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694627

Figure 3: Party Memberships of the Lawyers
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Table 2. Variable Homophily Blockmodels
of Tie Density by Categories (n=2,162)
Model

Tie probability

1. Gender
Intercept
Male
Female
R2

0.11
0.06
0.07
0.01

Model 2. Party
Intercept
Republican
Democrat
Other
R2

0.09
0.27 ***
0.11 *
0.08
0.08 ***

Model 3. Lawyer role
Intercept
Litigator
Legislative advocate
Other role
R2

0.10
0.01
0.10
0.14 **
0.03 **

Model 4. Region
Intercept
D.C.
South
Northeast
West/Midwest
R2

0.15
0.02
-0.15
-0.02
0.05
0.00

Model 5. Law school prestige
Intercept
Elite
Prestige
Regional
Local
R2

0.17
-0.08
-0.05
-0.07
0.05
0.01

Significance tests based on 5,000 random permutations.
* p<=.05; ** p<=.001; ***p<=.001
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Table 3. Bootstrapped Regressions of Centrality and Logged
Contributions (n=47)
Degree
centrality
M1

Variable
Female
Democrat
Other
Legislative advocate
Other role
South
Northeast
West/Midwest
Prestige
Regional
Local
Degree centrality
Intercept
R2

Political contributions,
2000-2008 (logged)
M2

-3.24 *
-3.15
4.27
5.96 ***

4.67

0.30 ***
4.02

0.28 *

0.20 ***

Significance tests based on 1,000 random permutations.
* p<=.05; ** p<=.001; ***p<=.001
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